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ABSTRACT

Although studies have suggested that moods may affect motivation, the nature of these effects remains obscure. To clarify the relationship between mood and motivation, manipulated mood and self-reports of mood were related to paper-and-pencil ratings of motivational orientation. College students (N=70) in Happiness Induction and Sadness Induction mood manipulating groups followed instructions for mood induction, reported their feelings on the Mood Adjective Checklist (MACL), and rated the attractiveness of 56 different general long-term life goals on the Goals Questionnaire. A manipulation check revealed that the mood induction had not significantly affected self-reports of any MACL mood factors. There were significant differences between the two groups on 11 of the goals rated, and significant differences on four additional scales for females only. Significant correlations with sad mood were found for 12 goal-scales with the entire group and for 15 goal-scales with female subjects alone. A cluster analysis of data resulted in the identification of five goal clusters (Jet Set, Self Improvement, Security, Other Orientation, Morality). Goals in the Jet Set cluster, which combined motives for wealth, glamour, and a very high social status, were involved in 31 of the 55 significant effects. All Jet Set goals were involved in at least one significant effect. The strongest trend in these results seems to be that sad mood is related, both experimentally and correlationally, to Jet Set goals. (NRB)

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Moods and Ratings of Life Goals

K.E. Roberson, F.W. Wicker, and R. Garcia-Falconi

A number of studies have demonstrated that those generalized affective states known as "moods" have a pervasive influence on a variety of psychological processes; in particular, on cognitions, judgements, and related behaviors. Positive mood, for example, has been found to be related to favorable ratings of the value of one's own possessions, of the attractiveness of ambiguous slides and facial expressions, and so on, whereas negative mood is related to unfavorable ratings of these things (cited in Clark & Isen, 1982). People with positive mood have also been found to have greater expectations for success and for other positive events, and lower thresholds for recognizing success-related words. They are more susceptible to persuasion attempts, they are less likely to perceive sadness in characters in a film, they are more likely to initiate conversation with a stranger, etc. (all cited in Clark & Isen, 1982).

Data of these kind suggest a link between affect and cognition, in that affect or mood may be characterized in terms of a general bias toward positive or negative appraisal, whether it be appraisal of one's own prospects, of the "goodness" of people and things, the value of arguments, the mood of another person, or whatever. Emphasis on appraisal suggests, in turn, a link between affect and motivation, since it is in the appraisal process that emotion, motivation, and cognition are most clearly seen to converge. Just as one's emotional reaction to a situation may be said to be based on appraisal of that situation (Arnold, 1960) so motivation cannot be independent of the discrepancy between appraisals of one's actual situation

and of one's goal situation. And effects of mood on motivation are indeed suggested by a number of research findings. Positive affect has been shown to be associated with better delay of gratification, greater resistence to playing with a forbidden toy, and less tendency to cheat (Clark & Isen, 1982) - - all of which suggest an increase in pro-social and/or long-term motives at the expense of short-term hedonistic motivation. Positive mood has also been found to increase self-gratification, and its documented effects on altruistic behavior may also reflect a motivational change (i.e., a change in pro-social motivation).

Although these results suggest motivational effects of mood, the nature of the effects remains obscure. What changes in motivation will induce self gratification in one situation, delay of self gratification in another, and altruistic behavior in a third situation? Motives to reduce negative affect, to enhance self concept, to achieve a sense of belongingness, etc., may be involved, but the evidence for them is highly conjectural at this point.

In the present study we attempted to help clarify such ambiguities by investigating the relationship between mood and motivation more directly than had been done in prior studies. Manipulated mood and self reports of mood were related to paper-and-pencil raltings of motivational orientation. For this purpose we used an instrument we call the Goals Questionnaire, on which participants rated the attractiveness of 56 different general long-term goals. Thus it was possible to look, in an exploratory way, for any of a variety of motivational correlates of mood.

Method

Subjects

Seventy undergraduate students at the University of Texas at Austin participated. Forty-three were males and 27 female. Thirty-five of them were meeting a research requirement for an introductory psychology course, and 35 were meeting a comparable requirement in an introductory educational-psychology course.

Design and Materials

The two experimental conditions in this study were called Happiness Induction and Sadness Induction. Subjects in both conditions worked with the same three-part booklet. All subjects were first asked to produce and rate three affect-laden images (see Procedures), and the instructions and scales for these ratings were on the first page of the booklet. The first scale for each image consisted of the digits 1 through 7 bounded by "Extremely Unclear" on the left and "Extremely Clear" on the right. For the second scale these digits were bounded by "No Emotion" and "Extreme Emotion". On the second page of the booklet was a copy of the Nowlis and Green Mood Adjective Check List (MACL) to be used as a manipulation check for induced mood. It was modified only to incorporate a seven-point numerical rating scale rather than the four-point scale of the original (Nowlis, 1970) (and by the addition of five new adjectives by the authors). Instructions and examples were printed at the top of the page. On subsequent pages of the booklet were the instructions and scales of the author's Goal Ratings instrument. Directly under each of 56 phrases representing general life goals (e.g., Wealth, Stability in Life, Wisdom, etc.) were the words "How much

do you want it? 0 not at all vs. 99 extremely" followed by space to write a number representing a rating on this 100-point scale. This scale had been developed in the attempt to represent a wide array of general life goals, as partly described in Wicker, Lambert, Richardson, and Kahler (in press).

Procedure

Sitting in a small laboratory room, subjects worked on their booklets in groups of 8 or fewer. First they were asked to produce images, which they were to "throw themselves into" and make as clear and lifelike as possible. Instructions were designed to encourage optimism that they would be able to develop skills for producing such images. The first induced image was of a "free-floating" emotion. Happiness Induction subjects were asked to imagine themselves lying awake feeling extremely happy. They were told that they did not know why they were happy, but that "you feel a surge energy and a sense of well-being, a feeling of trust in yourself and the world and that everything will work out in the long run. But mainly, beyond any reason that you can give, you just feel happy". Instructions were parallel for the Sadness Induction group except for substitution of "sadness" for "happiness" and the phrase "your body just feels tired and heavy and you have a vague general feeling of helplessness and loss, and a feeling that nothing in your life really matters in the long run". Subjects were given one minute to close their eyes and develop their image, before rating it on the two 7-point scales indicating clarity of the image and its effectiveness at arousing the emotion. Ratings were made by circling one of the seven digits for each scale. This procedure was repeated for a second image, except that this one was a memory image of a past situation in which they really had

felt the emotion appropriate to their induction condition, and then was repeated exactly againn for a third image which was identical to the first one.

Subjects next turned to a second page of the booklet, where they rated their "feelings of the present moment" on the MACL. Instructions were read aloud by the experimenter, as subjects followed at the top of the page, before ratings were made by circling one of the seven digits for each adjective.

Instructions for the Goal Ratings were also given orally, and in writing, and ratings were performed by writing a number from 1 to 99 on the line after each scale. Instructions were prefaced by "Next we'd like to ask you to do something a little different..." in order to mildly discourage hypotheses by subjects relating these ratings to earlier events. When they had completed the goal ratings, subjects were thanked and allowed to leave.

Results and Discussion

Results of the manipulation check were surprising in several ways. Despite the fact that imagery manipulations similar to the ones we used have been shown to affect mood in previous studies, mood induction did not significantly affect self reports of sadness, elation, or any of the 9 other mood factors measured with the Nowlis-Green mood scale. The other surprise is that, although mood induction did not have a detectible effect on mood, it did appear to affect goal ratings. There were significant differences between the two groups on 11 of the goals, which is almost 4 times the number to be expected by chance. And there were 4 additional scales for which differences were significant in the female sample only. These results were surprising because the goal ratings which were influenced were general and long-range in character, whereas the mood ratings were direct and immediate. Why would procedures directed at inducing a particular momentary mood influence a rating of long-term goals but not a rating of momentary mood? One possibility is that our procedures did produce subtle mood changes which mediated goal ratings, but that the self-report measures of mood was not sufficiently sensitive to detect these changes. Since the mood-induction procedure was followed immediately by the mood ratings, our attempt to manipulate mood must have been transparent to most participants, so their ratings may reflect a "reverse demand characteristic" or a belief that feelings cannot be manipulated so easily as we were attempting to do, which damped reported mood effects. Goal ratings, on the other hand, were not clearly associated with the mood induction. Another viable possibility, however, is that we did not influence mood at all in our study, but that the effect of mood-images on goal-ratings was

mediated by purely cognitive mechanisms. The latter interpretation would be consistent with the influencial view that mood effects are always mediated by cognitive processes, such as biases lin memory content which may produce bias in appraisals (Clark & Isen, 1982). If so, our data may indicate that such cognitive biases can be induced even by treatments that are not sufficiently strong to achieve mood changes.

Another way to relate moods and goals with our data was to correlate mood ratings and goal ratings. Significant correlations with sad mood were found for 12 goal-scales with the entire group of subjects and for 15 goal-scales with female subjects alone. Again this is over 4 times the number of significant effects to be expected by chance. The set of goals for which significance was obtained in this analysis overlapped partially, but not completely, with those emerging from group comparisons with ANOVA.

In the attempt to simplify and organize results for presentation, we performed an obligue principle-component cluster analysis, resulting in the 5 clusters shown in Figure 1. The clusters were labelled as indicated in this figure. We call the first cluster a Jet Set cluster because it combines motives for wealth, glamour, and a very high social status. It is important not only as the first cluster to emerge in this analysis, but also because a majority of the significant F-tests and correlations described before involved goals which fell in this cluster. The second figure (Figure 2) shows some of the p-levels for group comparisons and some of the correlations with sadness ratings for each sex separately and for the total group. Thirty-one of 55 significant effects obtained in these analyses involved Jet Set goals; the others were distributed rather evenly and thinly over the other clusters. Note also that all Jet Set goals were involved in at least one significant effect.

Cluster scores were computed by adding scores of all goals defining each cluster: in the figure it can be seen that the Jet Set cluster score was significantly related to mood induction condition and to sadness ratings for females and for the total group. Sadness ratings were positively related to Security cluster scores for females only and negatively related to Self Improvement and Morality cluster scores for males only.

Thus the strongest trend in these results seems to be that sad mood is related, both experimentally and correlationally, to Jet Set goals. This result seems consistent with the view that people react in a compensatory or "self therapeutic" way to sad mood. The Jet Set cluster may be described as self indulgent, since it entails strong rewards with little effort. These are also rewards which are not terribly realistic for most people. Thus the pattern may be one of compensating fantasy: "I'm feeling down now, but I balance my current misery with dreams of glory and self-indulgent pleasure in the future". Other interpretations are of course possible, and it remains to be seen whether this is a replicable finding, but the compensation theory is consistent with prior findings that failure to delay gratification and failure to resist temptation are associated with sad mood. And it does suggest one way that mood can influence motivation. Another interesting question for future research is whether the apparently greater strength of the compensatory mechanism with women is a reliable one, and - if reliable - what might be the reason for the sex difference. Might it reflect average differences in the kind of sad situations that are recalled by women and men, or differences in hopefulness about achieving more realistic and short-term solutions in these situations?

There were other effects not presented here which also appeared intriguing: for example, men were more likely to value independence and

freedom after happy images than after sad ones. But, because of the large number of analyses performed, we cannot tell which of these findings is simply due to chance.

References

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Figure 1

Clusters

1) Jet Set	2) Self Improvement	3) Security	4) Other Orientation	5) Morality
Wealth	Being intelligent	Security	A sense of belonging	Being a fair and ethical person
Excitement	Fulfilling your potential	Success	Making the world a better place	Committment to cause
Power	Wisdom	Stability	Love	Self knowledge
Social attractiveness	Improving self image		A cooperative life	Helping others
Physical attractiveness				Having firm values
A rich social life				
Being dominant, forceful				
Superiority				
Recreation and entertainment				
Easy life				
Being in the center of things				

Figure 2

	ANOVA P Levels			Correlations		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
Cluster 1						
Wealth	-	-	.02	-	-	-
Excitement	-	.007	.04	-	.60	.23
Power	.05	-	.02	-	.63	.24
Social Attraction	-	-	.03	-	-	-
Physical Attraction	.05	.05	.009	-	.48	.28
Competetive Life	-	.05	-	-	.49	-
Dominence	-	-	.02	-	.51	-
Recreation	-	.01	.03	-	.48	-
Superiority	-	.02	-	-	.63	.35
Rich Social Life	-	-	-	-	.44	.23
Center of Things	-	-	-	-	.52	.30
Easy Life	-	-	-	-	.45	.26
Cluster 1 Score	.09	.03	.006	-	.66	.31
Cluster 2						
Cluster 2 Score	-	-	-	-.32	-	-
Cluster 3						
Cluster 3 Score	-	-	-	-	.45	-
Cluster 4						
Cluster 4 Score	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cluster 5						
Cluster 5 Score	-	-	-	-.37	-	-